- New Jersey. The Montana result means that corporate political spending curbs cannot be justified by the factual record in a particular state. Is a legislative record made in support of special regulation of a particular industry really any different? New Jersey completely bans political contributions by corporations in regulated industries, including utilities, banks, and casinos. Might these prohibitions be vulnerable as not narrowly tailored to protect against quid pro quo corruption?
- New York State. The $5,000 annual aggregate cap on corporate political spending is clearly unconstitutional as applied to independent expenditures. But what of the political contributions that are also subject to that cap? Citizens United protects corporate political speakers against the disparate treatment. So how can a $5,000 aggregate limit for corporations remain valid when the comparable aggregate limit for individuals is $150,000?
- New York City. The Supreme Court’s approach to independent spending in state elections is a national application grounded in the federal statutory concept of independent expenditures. Given this starting point, how much leeway do local jurisdictions have in defining “non-independence” (a/k/a “coordination”)? For example, would it be constitutional to subject a corporate advertisement supporting a candidate’s position on public education spending to an in-kind contribution limit simply because the CEO had lobbied that candidate on an unrelated economic development question?
Tags: New York City • New Jersey • New York State